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Anatomy	of	a	wage	subsidy
Last	week,	the	UK	introduced	a	wage	subsidy	scheme	that	has	strong	similarities	with	the	German	Kurzarbeit
(‘short	work’)	programme.	Bob	Hancké,	Toon	Van	Overbeke	and	Dustin	Voss	argue	that	much	in	the	UK’s
approach	is	misguided.	The	German	scheme	works,	they	write,	because	it	has	three	critical	elements	that	are
wholly	or	mostly	absent	in	the	UK.	It	would	be	a	surprise,	therefore,	if	it	worked	as	intended	–	even	leaving	aside
the	potentially	prohibitive	shift	in	costs	from	government	to	employers.
The	new	UK	wage	subsidy	scheme	(the	Job	Support	Scheme	or	JSS),	introduced	by	Chancellor	Rishi	Sunak	on	24
September,	tries	to	balance	the	cyclical	short-term	problems	of	an	economic	downturn	with	the	longer-term
structural	problems	of	adjusting	to	the	emerging	new	economy.	As	our	colleague	Nick	Barr	points	out,	there	are
many	problems	with	that	balance.	But	leaving	that	aside,	the	policies	are	likely	to	be	problematic	for	a	set	of	deeper-
rooted,	institutional	reasons.
The	new	scheme	is	copied	almost	verbatim	from	the	existing	German	Kurzarbeit	programme	that	has	become
something	like	the	gold	standard	in	this	area.	But	crucially	the	performance	of	such	schemes	does	not	just	hinge	on
how	sensible	the	policies	themselves	are;	they	are	also	a	result	of	the	wider	institutional	context	in	which	they	are
introduced.	Three	elements	in	particular	seem	vital	for	the	success	of	this	type	of	wage	subsidy	scheme.
Carrots	and	sticks	aka	incentives
The	carrot:	German	employers	want	to	safeguard	their	large	investments	in	sophisticated	workforce	skills,	while
employers	in	the	UK	have	little	investment	to	protect:	Most	education	and	training	is	paid	for	by	government	and	the
individual.	The	stick:	German	employers	are	forced	to	negotiate	large	and	expensive	social	plans	with	trade	unions,
while	British	employers	can	more	or	less	unilaterally	fire	and	pay	out	a	ludicrous	notice	period	(one	week	per	year
worked	above	two	years,	else	zilch).
German	employers	thus	face	very	strong	incentives	to	adopt	Kurzarbeit,	almost	regardless	of	the	cost,	while	British
employers	face	the	opposite	incentives.	That	helps	understand	why,	as	the	Resolution	Foundation	has	calculated,
the	scheme	is	simply	too	expensive	for	most	employers	in	the	UK.	Those	in	the	real	world	outside	No	11	think	it	is	a
poor	scheme	because	it	is	too	expensive	and	contains	very	few	incentives	for	employers	to	pick	it	up.	In	light	of	the
carrot	point	above:	the	policy	makes	little	sense	for	employers,	unless	they	were	going	to	do	something	similar	on
their	own	account	anyway	and	can	now	have	the	government	pay	part	of	that.
German	company	governance
In	the	company,	where	it	is	implemented,	the	German	scheme	is	governed	by	employer	and	works	council	or	trade
union	(or	other	workforce)	representatives,	who	police	the	fairness,	correctness	and	fraud	in	its	implementation.
That	works	because	this	form	of	‘micro-corporatism’	is	deeply	embedded	in	a	thick	web	of	long-established	mutual
agreements,	expectations	and	trust	(supported	and	shaped	by	vetoes	that	the	workforce	can	exercise	in	particular
areas	of	company	organisation).	Calling	this	a	bit	weaker	in	the	UK	might	qualify	as	a	euphemism.
Macro-corporatism
At	a	political	level,	the	Kurzarbeit	scheme	is	in	many	ways	an	outcome	of	deeply	embedded	tripartite	arrangements
–	a	form	of	political	exchange	–	that	assign	rights	and	responsibilities	to	business/employers	and	labour	and	are
often	financially	and	institutionally	supported,	instigated	or	steered	by	government.	Participating	in	Kurzarbeit	is
therefore	almost	a	moral	obligation	for	employers	–	not	because	German	employers	are	fundamentally	nice	people
but	because	they	understand	the	strategic	long-term	benefits	of	having	a	stable,	functioning	macro-level
governance	arrangement	beyond	the	market.	Such	a	settlement,	if	it	ever	existed,	disappeared	in	the	Thatcherite
hurricane	of	the	1980s.
Combined,	these	three	points	show	why	importing	such	a	policy	and	expecting	the	same	outcome	as	elsewhere	is
questionable	at	best.	That	might	help	explain	why	few	observers	have	actually	seen	much	good	in	it.	As	the	days	go
on,	we	expect	an	avalanche	of	criticism	of	precisely	those	details	that	make	the	whole	JSS	a	big	mess.	The
opening	shots	were	fired	in	the	FT	and	the	Guardian	over	the	past	few	days.	Added	to	the	more	fundamental
critiques	here,	it	would	be	a	surprise	to	us	if	the	scheme	survived	in	its	current	form.
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